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TAKE THE MONEY AND RUN: 
DETAINMENT 
INCIDENT TO A SEARCH 




Prior to 1968, the Fourth Amendment prohibited police officers 
from detaining an individual without probable cause.1 However, Terry 
v. Ohio2 significantly complicated Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
ruling that some searches (and later seizures) are so substantially less 
intrusive than arrests that they are permissible without probable 
cause.3 Bailey v. United States4 challenges the scope of permissible 
non-arrest seizures by questioning whether it is permissible under the 
Fourth Amendment for police officers to detain an occupant of a 
residence, incident to a valid search warrant for that residence, who 
has left the premises prior to the search.5 The decision presents an 
opportunity for the Court to reinforce its long-held position that 
searches and seizures permitted without probable cause represent 
narrowly tailored exceptions to the probable cause requirement.6 The 
Court will likely decide that officers may not detain an occupant who 
has left the premises and announce a narrow limiting principle based 
on geographic proximity, similar to that expounded in the recent 
 
 J.D. Candidate, 2014, Duke University School of Law. 
 1.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that under particular circumstances, a 
police officer may detain an individual and “conduct a carefully limited” search for weapons 
without probable cause for arrest). 
 2.  392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Bailey v. United States, No. 11-770 (U.S. argued June 4, 2012). 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979) (referring to Terry and its progeny 
as “brief and narrowly circumscribed intrusions”). 
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Fourth Amendment case Arizona v. Gant.7 
II. FACTS 
In July of 2005, a Suffolk County Police Department detective 
obtained a search warrant for a basement apartment.8 The warrant 
specified that the target of the search was a chrome handgun and that 
the suspected occupant was a “heavy set black male with short hair” 
known as “Polo.”9 Shortly before executing the warrant, detectives 
observed two men, both matching the description of “Polo,” exit the 
stairway leading to the basement apartment, enter a vehicle, and drive 
away.10 After following the vehicle for approximately one mile, and 
around five minutes after the men exited the apartment, officers 
stopped the vehicle.11 
After the stop, detectives “patted-down” the two men and, upon 
request, the men identified themselves as Chunon Bailey (Petitioner) 
and Bryant Middleton.12 Despite presenting a driver’s license bearing 
a different address, Bailey told officers he was coming from his house, 
the basement apartment named in the warrant.13 Middleton 
corroborated Bailey’s statement.14 Thereafter, the men were placed in 
handcuffs and informed that they were being detained, not arrested, 
in relation to the execution of the search warrant.15 Bailey and 
Middleton were then transported back to the basement apartment.16 
Upon arrival, officers informed them that a gun and drugs were 
discovered during the search and subsequently arrested the two 
men.17 The period between Bailey’s stop and formal arrest was less 
than ten minutes.18 
 
 
 7.  556 U.S. 332 (2009); see id. at 351 (“Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent 
occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment 
at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the 
offense of arrest.”). 
 8.  United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 2710 
(U.S. June 4, 2012) (No. 11-770). 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. at 201. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
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The government indicted Bailey based on the evidence found in 
his home and his statements to the detaining officers.19 Bailey moved 
to suppress the evidence used to indict on the theory that the 
detainment violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment.20 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court held that Bailey’s 
detention was lawful under Michigan v. Summers21 because it was 
incident to the search warrant.22 In the alternative, the court stated 
that the detention was lawful under Terry as an investigative 
detention.23 After a nine-day trial, Bailey was found guilty on all 
charges.24 Bailey appealed the final judgment of conviction, arguing 
that his detainment was not lawful under either Summers or Terry.25 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”26 Prior to the seminal 
decision of Terry, the probable cause requirement, which was 
considered to be absolute, ensured a reasonableness requirement for 
all seizures of persons.27 The Supreme Court characterized the 
probable cause requirement as the best compromise between 
protecting citizens from “rash and unreasonable interferences with 
privacy” and allowing law enforcement sufficient latitude to protect 
the community.28 However, in 1968, the Supreme Court departed from 
traditional Fourth Amendment analysis by carving out an exception 
to the probable cause requirement29 and creating a new category of 
seizures to be evaluated for reasonableness under a balancing test 
rather than under the probable cause standard.30 
 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  452 U.S. 692 (1981); see id. at 705 (holding “that a warrant to search for contraband 
founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants 
of the premises while a proper search is conducted” (citations omitted)). 
 22.  Bailey, 652 F.3d at 201. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 202. Bailey also appealed on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. 
 26.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 27.  See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208–09 (1979) (“Terry for the first time 
recognized an exception to the requirement that Fourth Amendment seizures of persons must 
be based on probable cause.”). 
 28.  Id. at 208 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)). 
 29.  Id. at 209–10 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22–27 (1968)). 
 30.  See id. at 210 (“[Terry] defined a special category of Fourth Amendment ‘seizures’ so 
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A. The Creation of Non-Arrest Detainment Governed by the Fourth 
Amendment 
The Terry Court held that a police officer may temporarily detain 
and search an individual, without a warrant or probable cause, if the 
officer reasonably believes that criminal activity is afoot and the 
search is necessary to protect his safety or the safety of others in the 
area.31 The decision set precedent for the proposition that the Fourth 
Amendment permits forms of detainment besides arrests and, as a 
corollary, that such detainments may be permissible with less than 
probable cause.32 
Prior to Terry, “[t]he standard of probable cause represented . . . 
the minimum justification necessary to make the kind of intrusion 
involved in an arrest ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment.”33 In 
analyzing the protections of the Fourth Amendment, “[t]he term 
‘arrest’ was synonymous with those seizures governed by the Fourth 
Amendment.”34 Terry muddled these “relatively simple and 
straightforward” basic principles35 by drawing a distinction between 
less intrusive seizures and full-blown arrests.36 This new subcategory of 
seizures37 is not subject to the probable cause requirement,38 but 
rather must be determined “reasonable” under a relatively 
amorphous balancing test39 that analyzes both the government’s 
interests in executing the search or seizure and the harm that the 
search or seizure entails, on a case-by-case basis.40 
 
substantially less intrusive than arrests that the general rule requiring probable cause to make 
Fourth Amendment ‘seizures’ reasonable could be replaced by a balancing test.”). 
 31.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1986). 
 32.  See George E. Dix, Nonarrest Investigatory Detentions in Search and Seizure Law, 1985 
DUKE L.J. 849, 856–57 (“Terry held that one such type of detention . . . was permissible on less 
than probable cause.” (citation omitted)). 
 33.  Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 208. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  See Terry, 392 U.S. at 10–11 (discussing “the public debate over the power of the police 
to ‘stop and frisk’ . . . suspicious persons”). 
 37.  See id. at 16 (rejecting the notion that the use of the practice known as “stop and frisk” 
does not rise to the level of a “search” or “seizure”). 
 38.  See id. at 20 (“If this case involved police conduct subject to the Warrant Clause of the 
Fourth Amendment, we would have to ascertain whether ‘probable cause’ existed to justify the 
search and seizure which took place. However, that is not the case.”). 
 39.  See id. (“[T]here is ‘no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by 
balancing the need to search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) 
entails.’” (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967))). 
 40.  See id. (“[A] judge . . . must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or 
seizure in light of the particular circumstances.”). 
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Following Terry, the Court applied its exception to the probable 
cause requirement in other cases,41 though it was careful to limit the 
exception’s scope.42 The Supreme Court made clear that the probable 
cause requirement was still the relevant standard and that Terry and 
its progeny represent narrowly defined exceptions.43 However, the 
Court implied that it would be willing to apply the Terry balancing 
test to seizures that are “substantially less intrusive than arrests.”44 
B. Michigan v. Summers: The Evolution of Non-Arrest Detainment 
In Summers, the Court again faced the threshold issue of whether 
to evaluate the reasonableness of a pre-arrest seizure using the 
traditional probable cause requirement or the balancing test seen in 
Terry.45 The pre-arrest seizure in Summers occurred just prior to 
police officers executing a warrant to search a house for narcotics.46 
Before initiating the search, officers observed Summers descending 
the front steps of the residence and subsequently detained him while 
they searched the premises.47 After discovering narcotics and 
determining that Summers owned the home, the police arrested him.48 
The Court cited the Terry line of cases as recognizing that certain 
seizures, despite being covered by the Fourth Amendment, may be 
made based on less than probable cause because they constitute such 
a limited intrusion to the detainee and are justified by substantial law 
enforcement interests.49 The Court’s analysis traced the balancing test 
applied in Terry, weighing private and governmental interests in order 
 
 41.  See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (holding that 
special enforcement problems facing roving Border Patrol agents could justify vehicle stops if 
the agents were aware of specific facts indicating that the vehicle contained illegal aliens); 
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146–47 (1972) (holding that a police officer could use force to 
detain a suspect based on an informant’s tip that the suspect was armed and possessed 
narcotics). 
 42.  See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979) (“[T]his Court has been careful to 
maintain [Terry’s] narrow scope.”). 
 43.  See id. at 214 (“[O]ur recognition of the[] dangers [of not utilizing the probable cause 
requirement] and our consequent reluctance to depart from the proved protections afforded by 
the general rule, are reflected in the narrow limitations emphasized in the cases employing the 
balancing test.”). 
 44.  See id. at 212 (“The narrow intrusions involved in those cases were judged by a 
balancing test . . . only because these intrusions fell far short of the kind of intrusion associated 
with an arrest.” (citation omitted)). 
 45.  Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700–01 (1981). 
 46.  Id. at 693. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 696–99. 
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to determine which standard to apply.50 The Court ultimately 
permitted the detainment, noting numerous rationales to support the 
application of the balancing test, including: 
 A magistrate authorized a “substantial invasion of the 
privacy of the persons who resided” in the premises by 
issuing a search warrant after finding probable cause to 
believe that the law was being violated.51 
 The detainment was less intrusive than the search itself.52 
 Most citizens “would elect to remain” in the premises.53 
 The form of detention used was not likely to be abused or 
prolonged.54 
 The additional public stigma from the detainment would 
be minimal.55 
 “[P]reventing flight in the event that incriminating 
evidence is found.”56 
 Reducing the risk of physical harm to the officers.57 
 Facilitating the orderly competition of the search.58 
 The search warrant “provides an objective justification for 
the detention.”59 
 
 50.  See id. at 700–01 (“[I]n order to decide whether this case is controlled by the general 
[probable cause] rule, it is necessary to examine both the character of the official intrusion and 
its justification.”). 
 51.  Id. at 701. 
 52.  Id. The Court, however, admitted that the detainment was itself “a significant restraint 
on [the occupant’s] liberty.” Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. (“[T]he type of detention imposed here is not likely to be exploited by the officer 
or unduly prolonged in order to gain more information, because the information the officers 
seek normally will be obtained through the search and not through the detention.”). 
 55.  Id. at 702 (“[B]ecause the detention . . . was in respondent’s own residence, it could 
add only minimally to the public stigma associated with the search itself and would involve 
neither the inconvenience nor the indignity associated with a compelled visit to the police 
station.”). 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 702–03 (“[T]he execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of 
transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy 
evidence.”). 
 58.  Id. at 703 (explaining that the occupants of the residence may “open locked doors or 
locked containers to avoid the use of force that is not only damaging to property but may also 
delay the completion of the task at hand”). 
 59.  Id. at 703–04 (“The connection of an occupant to that home gives the police officer an 
easily identifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifies a 
detention of that occupant.”). 
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Following the recital of these considerations, the Court announced 
the categorical holding that “for Fourth Amendment purposes . . . a 
warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause 
implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants 
of the premises while a proper search is conducted.”60 Thus, the Court 
created another “narrowly defined intrusion”61 not subject to the 
probable cause requirement. 
In the wake of the decision, lower courts offered varied 
interpretations of the scope of Summers.62 One key issue in dispute is 
whether Summers gives authority to “detain an occupant who leaves 
the premises during or immediately before the execution of a search 
warrant and is detained a few blocks away.”63 Appellate courts that 
have considered the issue have split, with three allowing detention64 
and two disallowing it.65 Some of the legal and policy issues dividing 
the courts are whether Summers includes an implicit bright-line rule 
that limits detainment within a certain geographic proximity to the 
premises, whether police safety and efficiency rationales apply once 
the subject has left the premises, and whether granting authority to 
detain subjects that have left the premises would lead to abuse. 
In the 2009 case of Arizona v. Gant, the Supreme Court shed some 
light on how it might rule on the issue dividing the lower courts. Gant 
addressed the issue of whether police officers’ search of a suspect’s 
car, while the suspect was handcuffed in a police car, is a permissible 
search.66 In holding the search impermissible, the Court enumerated a 
geographic limiting principle, based largely on the conclusion that the 
rationales supporting the search of the car do not apply when the 
suspect is not within geographical proximity of the passenger 
compartment.67 
 
 60.  Id. at 705. 
 61.  Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 214 (1979). 
 62.  See United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 
2710 (U.S. June 4, 2012) (No. 11-770) (discussing the varied lower court decisions). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  See, e.g., United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1023 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Cavazos, 288 F.3d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Cochran, 939 F.2d 337, 341 (6th Cir. 
1991). 
 65.  See e.g., United States v. Edwards, 103 F.3d 90, 95 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Sherrill, 27 F.3d 344, 347 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 66.  Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009). 
 67.  See id. at 351 (“Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only 
if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the 
search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.”). 
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IV. HOLDING 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that the issue 
in Bailey was “decid[ing] whether the same authority pursuant to 
which police officers may detain an occupant at the premises during 
the execution of a search warrant permits them to detain an occupant 
who leaves the premises during or immediately before the execution 
of a search warrant and is detained a few blocks away.”68 In addressing 
an issue of first impression in the circuit,69 the court considered five 
other circuits’ holdings in cases bearing on essentially the same issue 
and comprised of similar facts.70 After reviewing the decisions, the 
court unanimously concluded that Summers permits officers to detain 
an occupant who leaves the premises, provided that the officers 
identify the subject “in the process of leaving the premises subject to 
the search” and detain the subject “as soon as practicable.”71 
The Second Circuit cited several of the justifications enumerated 
by the Seventh, Sixth, and Fifth Circuits in favor of extending 
Summers.72 These rationales, essentially the same as those offered in 
Summers, focus on police performance and safety,73 as well as on the 
existence of an identifiable justification for the detention.74 The cases 
that do not extend Summers discuss the same rationales, but 
emphasize that these rationales do not apply once a subject has left 
the premises.75 The Bailey Court vehemently disagreed with the latter 
 
 68.  Bailey, 652 F.3d at 204. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. at 204–06. 
 71.  Id. at 206. 
 72.  Id. at 204–05. 
 73.  United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1020 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that once the 
defendant became aware of the warrant he “became a flight risk and a potential risk to the 
officers’ safety in executing the warrant given his suspected illegal association with the 
residence”); United States v. Cavazos, 288 F.3d 706, 711 (5th Cir. 2002) (observing that the 
defendant’s conduct “warranted the belief that [the defendant] would have fled or alerted the 
other occupants of the residence about the agents nearby if he were released immediately after 
the stop and frisk”); United States v. Cochran, 939 F.2d 337, 339 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Summers does 
not impose upon police a duty based on geographic proximity (i.e., defendant must be detained 
while still on his premises); rather, the focus is upon police performance, that is, whether the 
police detained defendant as soon as practicable after departing from his residence.”). 
 74.  Bailey, 652 F.3d at 204 (“[T]he nexus between the defendant and the residence [gives] 
officers an ‘easily identifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal 
activity justifie[s] a detention of that occupant.’” (quoting Cavazos, 288 F.3d at 711)). 
 75.  Id. at 205 (citing United States v. Edwards, 103 F.3d 90, 94 (10th Cir. 1996); United 
States v. Sherrill, 27 F.3d 344, 346 (8th Cir. 1994)) (“[O]nce an occupant leaves . . . without 
knowledge of the warrant, Summers is inapplicable because he ceases to (1) be a threat to the 
officers’ safety, (2) be in a position to destroy evidence, or (3) be able to help facilitate the 
search . . . .”). 
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set of cases, concluding “that it is the very interests at stake in 
Summers that permit detention of an occupant nearby, but outside of, 
the premises.”76 The court noted that officers believed that drugs were 
being sold from the premises and that the suspected resident was 
armed, and therefore “it was reasonable for the officers to assume 
that detaining Bailey outside the house might lead to the destruction 
of evidence or unnecessarily risk the safety of the officers” by alerting 
potential occupants of an imminent search.77 Furthermore, because 
Bailey’s ten-minute detention was not unreasonably prolonged and 
officers did not “exploit the detention by trying to obtain additional 
evidence from Bailey,” the detention did not violate his Fourth 
Amendment rights.78 
V. ARGUMENTS 
A.  The Government’s Arguments 
The Government’s argument rests primarily on the claim that 
Bailey’s detention is justified by the same rationales underlying the 
Summers rule.79 It asserts that officers should be able to detain an 
occupant who has just left the premises because an occupant who 
learns of a search80 might flee the jurisdiction or return to the 
premises to disrupt the investigation.81 Detaining an occupant 
immediately is “far safer for officers” than letting an occupant leave 
and then detaining him upon his potential return.82 Further, the 
Government suggests that the occupant’s presence will help in the 
“orderly completion of the search” regardless of where the occupant 
was originally detained.83 Ultimately, the Government posits that the 
proper inquiry under Summers should be whether the detainment 
 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. at 206. 
 78.  Id. at 206–07. 
 79.  Brief for the United States in Opposition at 8, Bailey v. United States, No. 11-770 
(U.S. May 3, 2012) [hereinafter Brief in Opposition] (“[D]etention of an occupant of a place 
about to be searched . . . only marginally intrudes upon the occupant’s privacy interests, while 
such detention advances substantial law enforcement interests such as ‘preventing flight,’ 
‘minimizing the risk of harm to the officers,’ and ‘orderly completion of the search.’” (quoting 
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702–03 (1981))). 
 80.  Id. at 11 (“[A]nyone on the premises or nearby could readily alert a departing 
occupant to the search by placing a call to his cell phone or sending him a text message.”). 
 81.  Id. at 9. 
 82.  See id. at 11 (finding that the occupant may return to obstruct the search, possibly 
armed and with the assistance of others). 
 83.  See id. at 9 (“[T]he occupant can assist in opening any locked doors or containers.”). 
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occurred “as soon as practicable.”84 In support of its position, the 
Government points out that Summers itself noted that “the fact that 
respondent was leaving his house when the officers arrived” was not 
constitutionally significant.85 
B.  Bailey’s Arguments 
Bailey makes four distinct arguments in support of his plea for 
relief. First, the officers’ actions do not fall within the narrow 
exception to the probable cause requirement set out in Summers.86 
Second, the rationales that support Summers are not applicable once 
the occupant leaves the premises.87 Third, the detention of a departed 
occupant is more intrusive and poses a greater risk of abuse than the 
form of detention seen in Summers.88 Finally, the expansion of 
Summers would not be consistent with the Fourth Amendment and 
existing case law.89 
1. Bailey’s Detention Falls Outside the Scope of the Summers 
Rule 
Bailey asserts that Summers announced a categorical rule that 
permits the detainment of those who “presently occupy[] the 
premises” but does not permit detainment of “persons who have 
formerly occupied [the premises] and since departed.”90 Bailey posits 
that in the Court’s previous invocations of Summers, its analysis 
affirmed the proposition that the Summers exception governs only 
detentions that occur at the premises to be searched.91 Further, Bailey 
dismisses the fact that, in Summers, the individual was seized on the 
front steps of the home, rather than inside, as insignificant to the 
decision.92 Proceeding on the aforementioned analysis, Bailey 
emphasizes that the detention in the case at hand “differs in kind 
 
 84.  Id. at 9–10 (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 702 n.16). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Brief for the Petitioner at 9, Bailey v. United States, No. 11-770 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2012). 
 87.  Id. at 21. 
 88.  Id. at 31, 33–34. 
 89.  Id. at 37. 
 90.  Id. at 18–19 (citing Amir Hatem Ali, Note, Following the Bright Line of Michigan v. 
Summers: A Cause for Concern for Advocates of Bright-Line Fourth Amendment Rules, HARV. 
C.R.C.L. L. REV. 483, 500 (2010)). 
 91.  Id. at 19 (citing Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 
603, 611 (1999); Kolendar v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 364 n.2 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
 92.  See id. at 20 (“[The Court] appears to have applied the principle of de minimis non 
curat lex, concluding that the rationales supporting a detention when it occurs entirely inside the 
premises operated with similar force when the initial seizure occurs on the doorstep.”). 
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from the detention in Summers” for two reasons: the geographic 
proximity of the detainment to the residence and the greater indignity 
of Bailey’s more public initial detainment.93 Thus, Bailey concludes 
that the detention is not justifiable under Summers and that the 
circuit court erred in expanding the Summers rule.94 
2. The Rationales that Support Summers Do Not Support 
Extending the Rule to This Factual Scenario 
Upon concluding that Bailey’s detention was not permitted under 
a facial reading of Summers, Bailey argues that none of the rationales 
undergirding Summers support extending the rule to allow “the 
detention of a former occupant who leaves the immediate vicinity of 
the premises to be searched.”95 Bailey notes that although three of the 
rationales cited by the Summers Court—minimizing the risk of harm 
to officers, facilitating the orderly completion of the search, and 
preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found—
may seem to be applicable to the case at hand, the need to bolster 
these objectives is not so acute, in the present context, as to override 
Fourth Amendment protections.96 Bailey addresses each rationale in 
turn. 
Bailey begins by offering several reasons why an occupant who 
has left the premises poses a minimal safety risk. First, an individual 
that is not physically present poses no immediate threat of violence.97 
Second, because police will not want to disclose their presence prior 
to executing a search warrant, an occupant will typically have no 
reason to believe a search is imminent and therefore have no reason 
to communicate with other potential occupants that may 
subsequently threaten officers’ safety.98 
Bailey dismisses the Government’s argument that an occupant 
that leaves the scene may be alerted to the search by cell phone and 
then could “suddenly return—possibly armed and with the assistance 
of others—to obstruct the search.”99 Bailey argues that the use of 
SWAT teams and other precautions when serving high-risk warrants 
 
 93.  Id. at 20–21. Bailey also notes that the officers potentially manipulated the timing of 
the search to justify the detention. Id. 
 94.  Id. at 21. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 16–17. 
 97.  Id. at 22. 
 98.  Id. at 22–23. 
 99.  Id. at 23 (citing Brief in Opposition, supra note 79, at 11–12). 
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makes it unlikely that the occupant will return to disrupt the search.100 
Furthermore, Bailey suggests that accepting the Government’s 
argument would justify the detention of anyone associated with the 
premises, regardless of their location, because they may be alerted 
and return to disrupt the search as easily as an occupant that has just 
left the residence.101 Bailey also argues that allowing officers to 
conduct detentions away from the residence presents risks 
comparable to those involved in the execution of a search warrant, 
thus offering no additional safety incentive.102 
Finally, Bailey addresses the arresting officers’ and circuit court’s 
concern that “conducting the detention right outside would have 
alerted others who may still have been inside . . . potentially 
compromising the safety of the searching officers.”103 The weakness in 
this argument, Bailey asserts, is that it fails to consider that a 
detention need not take place.104 Rather, the individual may be 
allowed to leave the premises, thus preserving the officers’ safety.105 
Bailey goes on to argue that detaining an individual away from 
the premises does not help facilitate the orderly completion of the 
search. He notes that as a matter of common sense, an individual who 
is not present cannot interfere with the execution of a search.106 Bailey 
also argues that detaining an occupant away from the scene and 
returning him to the residence detracts from the search because it 
diverts human resources, crowds the site of the search, and potentially 
creates a distraction.107 Bailey dismisses as insignificant the 
Government’s argument that a returning individual may facilitate the 
search by opening locked doors or containers: such assistance is not 
always needed and cannot be compelled.108 
Moreover, Bailey states that preventing flight is not a valid 
rationale for permitting detainment because an individual who is not 
present will ordinarily be unaware of an imminent search and thus 
 
 100.  Id. at 24 (citing Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 
U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 270 (1984)). 
 101.  Id. at 25. 
 102.  Id. at 26. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. at 27. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. at 28. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
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have no reason to flee.109 Bailey goes on to address the Government’s 
argument that detainment is justified because a third party could alert 
the occupant who has left the residence, prompting an occupant to 
flee.110 He claims that this argument could be used to justify the 
detention of anyone associated with the premises, regardless of his 
location, because the incentive to flee would be identical regardless of 
his proximity to the premises.111 Bailey also points out that officers 
have alternative means of preventing flight or locating a suspect in 
the event of flight that mitigate the Government’s prevention of flight 
concerns.112 
3. The Detention of an Occupant Who Has Left the Premises Is 
More Intrusive and More Prone to Abuse 
Bailey states that a detainment away from the immediate vicinity 
of the residence “produce[s] all the indignity of an arrest in full view 
of the public.”113 This additional indignity is caused by a prolonged 
public detainment that involves being placed in handcuffs and being 
transported in a police car.114 Moreover, Bailey states that because a 
detention away from the residence must be conducted by a team of 
officers, separate from the team preoccupied with conducting the 
search, there is greater opportunity for the detaining officers to 
conduct questioning that would not ordinarily be permissible without 
individualized suspicion.115 This allegedly creates a perverse incentive 
for officers to detain individuals outside the premises in order to 
facilitate otherwise impermissible questioning.116 
 
 
 109.  Id. at 29. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 30. 
 112.  See id. (“Officers can follow an individual who has left the scene and then detain him 
in the event that incriminating evidence is [found] . . . . [T]hey can readily gather identifying 
information that will help track down the individual.”). 
 113.  Id. at 32 (citing Commonwealth v. Charros, 824 N.E.2d 809, 816 (Mass. 2005), cert. 
denied, 546 U.S. 870 (2005)). 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  See id. at 33–34 (noting that in a detainment in or around the immediate vicinity of the 
residence, the officers “will likely be too preoccupied with effectuating the search to take unfair 
advantage of the individual”). 
 116.  Id. at 34. 
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4. Extending Summers Would Be Inconsistent with the Text of the 
Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s Relevant 
Jurisprudence 
Bailey asserts that extending Summers is incongruent with other 
Fourth Amendment categorical rules.117 Rules governing searches 
incident to arrests, which Bailey equates to seizures incident to 
searches, typically come with spatial and temporal limitations.118 
Bailey suggests that the proper reading of Summers contains just such 
a spatial limitation and that to disregard any of the typical limiting 
principles of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence would be inconsistent 
with the Court’s rulemaking in other cases.119 
Finally, Bailey argues that any extension of Summers is 
inconsistent with an originalist interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment.120 After briefly examining the motivations behind the 
Fourth Amendment,121 Bailey concludes that extending Summers 
would “create a freestanding right to seize persons” that falls outside 
the original intent of the Framers to limit seizures to cases with 
probable cause.122 
VI. ANALYSIS AND DISPOSITION 
In announcing the Summers categorical rule that “a warrant to 
search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries 
with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises 
while a proper search is conducted,”123 the Supreme Court failed to 
specify explicitly whether the rule carried with it any geographical 
restrictions. As a result, what should have been a bright-line rule124 
contained sufficient elasticity to be extended in a manner inconsistent 
with its underlying rationales, and consequently, with its Fourth 
 
 117.  Id. at 36. 
 118.  Id. (citing Wayne R. LaFave, Being Frank About the Fourth, 85 MICH. L. REV. 427, 
455, 457 (1986)). 
 119.  Id. at 36–37 (citing Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990); Chimel v. California, 395 
U.S. 752 (1969)). 
 120.  Id. at 37. 
 121.  See id. (noting that the Fourth Amendment was adopted largely because of the 
Framers’ dislike of the use of general warrants (citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 761; Henry v. United 
States, 361 U.S. 98, 100–01 (1959))). 
 122.  Id. at 37–39. 
 123.  Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981). 
 124.  See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 
U. PITT. L. REV. 227 (1984) (describing Summers as a bright-line rule). 
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Amendment restraints.125 
The Court in Bailey will likely put articulable limits on officer 
discretion in applying Summers, much like it did in Arizona v. Gant, in 
order to avoid regular constitutional violations.126 In reaching a 
conclusion, the Court will likely consider two primary questions: did 
the officers’ conduct result in an intrusion equivalent to an arrest, and 
if not, was the conduct reasonable in light of the conflicting interests 
at stake? 
First, the Court will likely hold that the officers’ conduct did not 
result in an intrusion equivalent to an arrest. The factual 
circumstances of Bailey’s detainment differ from the detention in 
Summers; Bailey was handcuffed and driven a short distance back to 
his residence in a police car while Summers was detained just outside 
of his home. While being handcuffed and escorted in a police car are 
certainly indicia of a typical arrest, the Summers Court accorded low 
weight to the public nature of that detainment,127 suggesting that it is 
unlikely that the Court will view the public stigma associated with a 
short ride in a police car as raising the level of intrusion to the point 
at which probable cause is required.128 
Second, the Court will likely engage in a “reasonableness” 
balancing test to determine whether an extension of the Summers rule 
would be constitutionally permissible.129 After weighing the relevant 
factors, the Court will likely decline to extend the Summers rule and 
instead implement a geographic-proximity limiting principle similar 
 
 125. Amir Hatem Ali, Note, Following the Bright Line of Michigan v. Summers: A Cause for 
Concern for Advocates of Bright-Line Fourth Amendment Rules, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
483, 512 (2010) (“When courts do not strictly adhere to the policies underlying the bright-line 
rule that they apply, they risk extending that rule beyond its rationale, and, in the Fourth 
Amendment context, beyond constitutionality.”). 
 126.  Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 344–48 (2009) (holding that a supposed bright-line rule 
permitting searches of vehicles upon custodial arrests was being interpreted and applied in a 
way that resulted in regular constitutional violations). 
 127.  Summers, 452 U.S. at 702 n.16 (“We do not view the fact that [the defendant] was 
leaving his house when the officers arrived to be of constitutional significance. The seizure of 
[the defendant] on the sidewalk outside was no more intrusive than the detention of those 
residents of the house whom the police found inside.”). 
 128.  But see United States v. Sherrill, 27 F.3d 344, 346 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting, while 
discussing Summers, that “[b]ecause Sherrill had already exited the premises, the intrusiveness 
of the officers’ stop and detention on the street was much greater”). 
 129.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (“[T]here is no ready test for determining 
reasonableness other than balancing the need to search (or seize) against the invasion which the 
search (or seizure) entails.” (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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to the “within reaching distance” standard announced in Gant.130 The 
Summers Court noted that a detainment incident to a search warrant 
is a “significant restraint on . . . liberty.”131 Consequently, the Court is 
unlikely to impose such a restraint without the full force of law 
enforcement interests counterbalancing the restraint on liberty. 
Thus, the factor that lends greatest support to the aforementioned 
outcome is that the “law enforcement interests” presented in support 
of the holding in Summers dissipate when the occupant is no longer 
on the premises.132 The Court agreed with an almost identical 
argument in Gant, refusing to find that a suspect poses a danger to 
officers when the suspect is not within reaching distance of his 
vehicle.133 The logic of the Gant Court can be summarized as the 
common-sense notion that an individual, who, due to his physical 
location, is incapable of harming officers, poses little risk. In 
translating that logic to the case at hand, the Court will surely note 
that there is a difference in the risk posed by a suspect in police 
custody who is out of reach of any dangerous items, as in Gant, and an 
occupant of the premises to be searched who has left the area. 
Nevertheless, the Court is also likely to observe that the distinction in 
the respective risk to officers only materializes in the event that the 
occupant returns to the premises during the course of the searchan 
unlikely assumption. Moreover, the risk posed by an occupant who is 
not present during a search is decidedly lower than even the risk 
posed by a detained suspect. Thus, because the Supreme Court was 
persuaded that the lack of physical proximity limits the risk of officer 
harm in an analogous case,134 the Court is unlikely to sacrifice Fourth 
Amendment protections as a result of the relatively minor differences 
between two similarly situated groups: suspects who pose minimal 
danger because of their distance from potentially dangerous objects, 
and occupants who pose minimal danger because of their distance 
 
 130. Gant, 556 U.S. at 351. 
 131. Summers, 452 U.S. at 701 (“The detention of one of the residents while the premises 
were searched [was] admittedly a significant restraint on his liberty . . . .”). 
 132.  See Sherrill, 27 F.3d at 346 (“[W]hen the officers stopped Sherrill, the officers had no 
interest in preventing flight or minimizing the search’s risk because Sherrill had left the area of 
the search and was unaware of the warrant. Thus, we decline the Government’s invitation to 
extend Summers to the circumstances of this case.” (citation omitted)). 
 133.  Gant, 556 U.S. at 351. 
 134.  Id. at 347 (declining to extend New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), because the 
Court was “unpersuaded by the State’s arguments that a broad reading of Belton would 
meaningfully further law enforcement interests and justify a substantial intrusion on individuals’ 
privacy”). 
HALL FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE) 1/14/2013  5:56 PM 
2013] TAKE THE MONEY AND RUN 87 
from the premises. 
In implementing a limit on officer discretion, the Court will likely 
utilize a geographic-proximity restriction, similar to that seen in Gant, 
that stems from the same principles elucidated by Eighth and Tenth 
Circuit decisions.135 While the circuit court in Bailey stated that 
imposing bright-line geographic restrictions on the Summers rule 
would present officers with a Hobson’s choice,136 the Supreme Court is 
likely to disagree with that assessment.137 It would be hyperbolic to 
characterize officers’ options as a binary choice between detaining the 
occupant as he leaves the premises or losing the occupant forever.138 
More likely, the Court will apply a spatial restriction in order to 
protect personal liberty interests while imposing only an 
inconvenience to law enforcement officials.139 
 
 135.  See Sherrill, 27 F.3d at 346 (declining to apply Summers because “the officers had no 
interest in preventing flight or minimizing the search’s risk because Sherrill had left the area of 
the search”); see also United States v. Edwards, 103 F.3d 90, 93–94 (10th Cir. 1996) (explaining 
that because the defendant was not present at the location of the search, the rationales 
underlying Summers did not justify the detention). 
 136.  United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 205–06 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 
2710 (U.S. June 4, 2012) (No. 11-770) (noting that extending Summers would leave officers with 
the choice of either immediately detaining an occupant observed leaving the premises or 
permitting the occupant to leave). 
 137.  See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The 
weakness of this argument is that it assumes that, one way or another, the search must take 
place. But conducting a Chimel search is not the Government’s right; it is an exception—
justified by necessity—to a rule that would otherwise render the search unlawful.”). 
 138. See United States v. Edwards, 103 F.3d at 93–94 (noting that the police’s interest in 
preventing flight was reduced because “Edwards did not know that any warrant was being 
executed. He thus had no reason to flee. The police knew the address of Edwards’s . . . 
residence, and had no reason to believe that he would not return to it . . . .”). 
 139.  See Gant, 556 U.S. at 347 (“Construing Belton broadly to allow vehicle searches 
incident to any arrest would serve no purpose except to provide a police entitlement, and it is 
anathema to the Fourth Amendment to permit a warrantless search on that basis.”). 
